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America, the War of 1739-1748 and the development of British Global Power  
Richard Harding  
 
 
 
The point at which Britain became a global power is not easy to identify.  The 
definition of global power is slippery. Even if a definition could be agreed, power is 
fragile, being conditional on many physical and psychological variables which are in 
constant state of flux. Few powers have ever come close to exercising what would 
commonly be regarded as global power, but Britain is one of these and it is commonly 
accepted that this became evident in the Seven Years War (1756-1763)1. British 
maritime and military resources had developed sufficiently to take decisive military 
action in most of the coastal regions of the inhabited world and this action also had a 
clear diplomatic impact.  
 
Gorée (1758), Guadeloupe (1759), Québec (1759), Montreal (1760), Dominica 
(1760), St Lucia (1760), Martinique (1761), Havana (1762) and Manila (1763) all fell 
to British forces. British positions in India were secured. The sophisticated use of 
seapower undoubtedly lay at the heart of this achievement. By tight blockade, the 
French and later the Spaniards were prevented from sending succour to their 
threatened colonies2. It enabled the British to move resources in America and Europe 
to their enemies’ strategic weak points. It enabled them to shift the focus of attack 
when stalled, as they did at St Malo in 1758 and Martinique in 1759. Over 38,000 
British regulars were carried to North America by 1759, who sealed the fate of New 
France by the end of 17603. Without this level of sea domination, it is extremely 
doubtful that these campaigns in both hemispheres would have yielded the results that 
they did.  
 
However, seapower alone would not have done the job. The ability of the Pitt-
Newcastle coalition to manage Parliament was critical to the provision of finance for 
the war. The sums required to prosecute this war were unprecedented. Pitt’s 
recognition that the political platform on which he had launched he assault on power – 
that of a colonial war – was flawed, is also an important feature of the overall success 
of the coalition. From 1758, money and large numbers of troops had to be sent to 
Europe to support the Prussians and revenge the fall of Hanover. 
 
 
Equally important was the effective mobilisation of land forces which were supported 
from the sea. In North America and India the processes are work were very different 
but essential if British objectives were to be achieved. In North America, the 
provincial regiments played an important role. From a force of under  7,000 truculent 
New Englanders and New Yorkers around Fort Edward and Fort William Henry in 
the summer of 1756, the provincial contribution rose to just under 20,000 in 1758 
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and17594. The long lines of communication up the Hudson and the Mohawk Valleys 
were guarded by these troops, enabling the regulars to concentrate at the cutting edge 
of the attacking force. The colonies provided batteau-men ,wagons and drivers. Some 
colonists were also induced to join the regulars – most significantly,  the 60th (Royal 
Americans) which was four battalions strong. American provincial troops were also 
important elements within the successful expeditions sent to the West Indies under 
Lord Rollo in 1760 and joining Albemarle’s attack on Havana in 1762.  
 
The days when the victories of the Seven Years War were attributed primarily to the 
genius of William Pitt are now passed. A number of recent studies have charted the 
course of the war and noted how decisions were made, resources shifted and strategy 
carried out5. Fighting the Seven Years War was a complex operation. The 
development of law to reinforce naval policy, such as the Rule of 1756, and the use of 
the East India Company were both important additional factors. The war was an 
example of how the British government managed to integrate resources and, for want 
of a better expression, various social, economic and political ‘systems’ to a specific 
end – the defeat of France and Spain. 
 
What is less clear is how the mechanisms for the success of the Seven Years War 
were developed in previous decades. A great deal had been inherited from precedent. 
We know, for example, that there was nothing particularly unusual about the way the 
naval administration related to the executive in this period. Pitt’s relations with the 
Admiralty were little different from that of other first ministers6. We know that the 
formal processes by which Pitt corresponded with the commanders in the field were 
no different from precedents. We know that in most cases the contracting procedures 
were no different. There were important administrative modifications that became 
practicable and necessary as the infrastructure and resources for war developed during 
1758, but it is also true that much had already been learned as a result of war in the 
previous decade. The raising of the provincial regiments was one of the aspects of 
successful imperial warfare that owed a lot to the experience gained in the previous 
war.  
 
The War of 1739-1748 has not attracted the attention of other Eighteenth Century 
conflicts. Apart from the Jacobite Rebellion, the war probably has less drama than any 
of the other conflicts. Its conclusion,  broadly on the basis of the status quo ante, 
suggests that it was a rather futile bloodletting  that ended in little more than a truce, 
before war resumed to reach the great climax of rivalries in the Seven Years War. For 
Britain the war was problematic. Starting very clearly as a dispute with Spain over 
colonial trading rights, it merged with the dispute over the Austrian succession, the 
defence of Hanover and the United Provinces. The direction of the war and its various 
objectives were not easily reconciled. However, by the end of the war, the problems 
of conducting major campaigns in the colonies and the extent of the threat posed by 
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France to Britain’s colonial position were both in sharper focus than they had been in 
17397.  
 
An important factor in sharpening that focus was the mobilisation of American 
resources during the war and the impact of events in America on its progress. It has 
long been recognised that maritime society in America played a great part  in the 
Seven Years War. The coastal waters of North America were not covered effectively 
by the Royal Navy as a matter of course8. Trade to America and, particularly, the 
West Indies, was valuable but dangerous. It was an ideal ground for the working of  
privateers. American privateers disrupted the vital traffic in foodstuffs to the French 
and Spanish islands in the West Indies. Although American merchants also had the 
irritating habit of trading these same commodities to those islands, they, nevertheless, 
provided the victuals and stores that kept the British island economies going during 
the war. These activities were well established in the war of 1739-1748. At least 466 
privateering voyages  set out from North American and Caribbean ports during the 
war and 829 prizes were taken9. It has been estimated that about 30% of French trade 
fell victim to privateers in the war, severely damaging trade to Canada and the West 
Indies. It terms of overall impact it is difficult to argue with Carl Swanson’s verdict in 
1985 that in terms of numbers of men and economic resources  employed, 
‘privateering operations played the leading role in America’s war effort and made a 
major contribution to British seapower by disrupting Spanish and French 
commerce’
10
. 
 
The thriving ports of British North America, particularly New England and New 
York, not only provided seamen for privateers, but also seamen for local guard 
vessels and Royal Navy ships. This pressure on manpower led to impressment11. The 
reaction of seamen in American ports to impressment was very similar to that in 
British ports. During wartime they did what they could to take advantage of the rising 
wages on merchant vessels or the prize opportunities in  privateers. They were 
assisted by the ambiguous legal position of pressing in the northern colonies. Royal 
Navy captains considered that the act of 1707 which prohibited pressing in North 
America had expired with the peace in 1713. The colonists and the seamen believed 
otherwise. Pressing went ahead once the war had brought Royal Navy vessels into 
American waters. Tension increased throughout the war, especially after the outbreak 
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of the French war in 1744, when naval vessels were more commonly in American 
ports and American labour was under pressure for other warlike activities. It 
culminated in the ‘Knowles Riots’ in November 1747. Commodore Charles Knowles 
brought his squadron to Boston and began to press seamen. For two days a mob held 
naval officers captive and forced Governor Shirley to seek sanctuary at Castle 
William. The mob finally dispersed and the officers were released12. While the riots 
did not stop the practice of pressing, they have been examined by Lax and Pencak in 
the context of making a major contribution to developing the theory of resistance to 
British imperial authority. 
 
Whereas Swanson is right in highlighting the contribution of privateering to the 
conduct of the war, and Lax and Pencak are also right to emphasise the role of 
impressment in forcing Massachusetts to become aware of what they called ‘the 
imperial context of its existence’ 13, there was another contribution to the British war 
effort that may also have had important consequences for the conduct of war and the 
future of the empire. This was the raising of the American regiment of foot in 1740. It 
did not have a long or glorious history, but it was a forerunner of the large military 
forces raised in America. As such it played an important part in converting British 
maritime power into effective imperial power.  
 
 
The Military-Naval Situation 1713-1739 
 
Britain had emerged from the War of Spanish Succession in1713 with the nature of 
her military power unclear. Marlborough’s campaigns from 1703-1710 had been 
crowned with some spectacular victories, but they had not led to clear-cut, sustained 
advantage to the Allies. The campaigns in Italy and Spain had been equally devoid of 
apparently decisive results. The campaigns at sea and in the colonies were likewise, 
mixed in their results. However, the manner in which the Tory ministry engaged in 
the peace negotiations from 1710 gave a powerful boost to the belief that these latter 
campaigns were the most significant. A Bourbon king ruled Spain, but with some 
caveats to ensure that Spain remained an independent power. Although fragile, this 
was something which the allied armies had achieved in Europe. On the other hand, the 
defence of Great Britain against invasion in 1708 and the capture of Gibraltar, 
Minorca and Newfoundland were all achieved by naval power. The rhetoric that 
surrounded the negotiations and the justification for abandoning the Grand Alliance 
publicly juxtaposed the clarity of British conquests by naval power with the inevitably 
limited results that would be achieved by allied armies14. In March 1714, Queen Anne 
told the assembled Houses of Parliament :- ‘Our situation points out to us by our true 
interest, for this country can flourish only by trade, and will be most formidable by 
the right application of our Naval Force’15.  
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How deeply held was this confidence in naval power is difficult to tell. Whether 
successive ministers believed that the naval force, as constituted in the 1720s and 
1730s, was really the ideal tool for British diplomatic pressure, or whether they were 
simply pragmatic enough to accept that it was the only force that was politically 
acceptable, is impossible to tell. The track-record is ambiguous. Operations against 
the Jacobites, the expeditions to the Baltic, the operations in the Mediterranean and 
the West Indies in the 1720s all had mixed results. The importance of the French 
alliance between 1716 and 1731, which enabled British naval units to focus on events 
outside the Channel must not be under-estimated16.  While the alliance held, the 
successes of the navy were enough to preserve the belief that naval power could 
achieve British diplomatic objectives.  
 
The most significant problems faced by Britain in the 1720s related to Russia, whose 
control over the Baltic and threat to Hanoverian interests had to be watched carefully 
and Spain, whose Italian ambitions and distaste over the commercial treaty relating to 
the West Indies had left important unfinished business. While Russia did not prove 
particularly amenable to seapower, Spain at least seemed vulnerable. Squadrons in the 
Mediterranean, off Cadiz and in the West Indies could disrupt Spanish plans, and 
prevent the vital flow of silver from the New World to Spain. The crumbling of the 
Anglo-French alliance in 1731 changed the diplomatic situation. Throughout the 
1720s French mercantile and naval power had been growing. The new generation of 
French ships of the line were larger than their British counterparts. French overseas 
trade was growing at a faster rate than British trade – possibly as much as 600% in the 
years between 1713 and 174417. To some informed observers, there must come a time 
when France would overtake Britain in both trade and naval power, which when 
combined with her much larger standing army must make Britain extremely 
vulnerable18. 
 
How was this new problem to be addressed? The principle defence lay in alliances to 
counter the French. The most obvious ally was Austria, and it had been the Treaty of 
Vienna in March 1731 that was the immediate cause of  the breech with France. Sir 
Robert Walpole’s ministry developed this alliance to include Spain and the United 
Provinces, but Britain’s failure to join Austria during the War of Polish Succession 
(1733-5), undermined the confidence that the allies might have had in this treaty19. 
Professor Black has argued that Walpole was wise to stay out of the war. Black 
argued that Walpole recognised, unlike later historians such as Sir Richard Lodge, 
that Britain did not have the resources for effective participation European conflict 
and that there was a very real danger posed by Jacobitism. He may have been buying 
time or even hoping for fortune to provide a favourable outcome, but he could not 
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have predicted a war with Spain would break out in 1739 nor that the Austrian 
Succession would be violently challenged in 1740. Whether or not this is true, the 
unfortunate result, whether Austria won or lost the war over Poland,  was that 
Austrian resentment would underpin her future reaction to French threats to Britain.  
 
If the diplomatic environment left Britain isolated and in some difficulty in the event 
of a crisis, the domestic situation only compounded this. Walpole’s ministry was 
afflicted by twin difficulties in the 1730s. Opposition had been gathering since 1727. 
He was suspected of trying to create a tyrannical absolutist state, exemplified by the 
Excise Bill of February 1732 and the dismissals that followed its withdrawal in 
March. The 1734 election saw another tranch of political casualties as those that had 
opposed the Excise or shown support for those dismissed earlier fell victim to the 
Robinocracy. On the other hand, Walpole was suspected of being too weak towards 
France over British rights on St Lucia and the Dunkirk fortifications. Walpole 
survived the domestic crisis of 1733-4, but portrayed as a domestic tyrant and a 
weakling in foreign affairs, he appeared as the reverse of the ideal minister of a just 
and powerful prince.  
 
The Colonial Situation 
 
Britain had emerged from the War of Spanish Succession with its colonial possessions 
in tact. While very different in social structure and economic activity and jealous of 
their individual charter rights, the colonies of North America and the West Indies 
were perceived a single unit to contemporaries in London. The importance of these 
colonies was not doubted, nor was the potential danger from Spanish and French 
expansion. The ability of the metropolitan powers to defend their colonial possessions 
was limited to the resources they could spare from home defence added to any 
resources that could be generated locally. In the 1680s the immature colonies had 
little defences and the metropolitan powers could spare little to send out to them. A 
treaty of neutrality had been negotiated in 1686 in the vain hope that war in Europe 
would not spread to the Americas. The war of 1689-1697 soon demonstrated the 
impossibility of this. Eight French or British expeditions were sent to the Americas in 
this war and another 21 between 1701 and 171320. The results were not particularly 
impressive. Almost all of these expeditions went, primarily, to the West Indies. There 
were expeditions of conquest, although these had generally failed. There were, 
nonetheless, clear warning signs. Cartagena de las Indias fell to a French raiding force 
in 1697 and Rio in 1711. The message was not lost on the Spanish crown, which 
started to strengthen the fortifications of its principal ports as soon as the war ended. 
None of the European powers had adequate resources to spare to tackle the vast 
distances and spaces of North America. Some troops, probably less than 200, were 
raised in New England in 1702 for an attack upon the French West Indies21. 450 
marines were sent to support American attacks upon Port Royal (Acadia) in 1709 and 
for a while the prospect of taking Québec led to the despatch of 5000 regulars to New 
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England in 171122. This abortive expedition was the only large scale operation by 
regular forces on either side in North America. For the most part,  the war in this 
region was carried on by local forces – militias, levies and Indian allies. It was brutal 
frontier war, but without the organisation and depth of resources to deal decisive 
blows at the centres of population or economy.  
 
After 1713, the colonies continued to be seen as a vital part of the British economy. 
Sugar production continued to expand and employ more shipping, increasing 49% in 
the second decade of the century and a further 37% in the next decade23. Tobacco was 
also vital re-export commodity from the Chesapeake Bay area.  North America was 
the bread basket, the victualling base, the storehouse, and the centre of shipping to 
service the West Indian economy. The trade to the Americas employed possibly as 
much as a quarter of British shipping in 172124. Boston was the largest centre of 
shipping outside of Britain. It was a period of major expansion of colonial 
shipbuilding.  Approximately one third of total British tonnage was built in the 
American colonies by 177525. While large metropolitan resources could not be spared 
for attack or defence, the colonies had to be defended. The economic primacy of the 
West Indies, and the political relationship of these colonies with Britain led to 
significant expansion of the naval infrastructure, but North America was largely left 
alone.  
  
The War of Spanish Succession had not left a clear legacy for the defence of these 
colonies. The hope that the 1686 treaty of neutrality could be revived appears 
periodically in the correspondence of the Board of Trade. The belief, also inherited 
from the previous century, that the navy could provide the defence was fine so long as 
British naval resources could be despatched in good time to thwart any European 
powers which launched large scale forces against the colonies. Also, so long as local 
forces were adequate to defend against locally raised threats to the colonies. On the 
whole, during the period between 1713 and the late 1730s the perception in Britain of 
a foreign threat by direct attack on her colonies was slight. Indeed, British naval 
power in the Caribbean was used to resolve disputes in Europe with Spain and 
Austria26. The worries were more indirect and long-term: that French colonial trade 
would eventually eclipse British commerce; that France could at some unspecified 
point outbuild British naval forces; that the Spanish aggressive defence of her own 
colonies by the guarda costas would disrupt and destroy British colonial trade.  
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North America posed a different problem. While there is little evidence of a consistent 
British willingness to expand her North American possessions, there was colonial 
pressure to expand westward, and a constant fear of the ‘unlimited inclination’ of the 
French to expand from the St Lawrence to the Mississippi to ‘set a girdle’ on the 
British colonies27.  In the view of the Board of Trade, French expansion was primarily 
stimulated by missionaries who converted or seduced the tribes rather than by the 
French crown. Their conventional wisdom seems to have been that while France was 
preoccupied with Europe, she would have little time for her colonies.  
 
Throughout the period from 1713 to 1739 the question of large scale operations in the 
Americas had not been raised. While there lurked an undeniable long term indirect 
threat to the economic future of the colonies, Britain was slowly developing a solid 
maritime and colonial infrastructure that preserved her military advantage in the 
region. 
 
The Outbreak of War  
 
By late May 1739 Britain was facing a crisis. The dispute with Spain over the right of 
search of British merchant vessels suspiciously close to Spanish colonies had reached 
an impasse28. Fear of French economic power, Spanish disruption of British trade and 
suspicion of Walpole’s capability in foreign policy combined to stimulate a powerful 
and bellicose opposition. Some of these fears and suspicions were shared by ministers 
in Walpole’s ministry. For them, like the opposition, war was unavoidable. While 
ministerial views on the conduct of  the war were open, opposition demands for a 
substantial expedition to take and hold some part of the Spanish empire as a 
bargaining piece were tremendous. The widespread belief that the Spanish colonies 
were weak, that time was running out and that Britain held the advantage, was as 
widespread as it was misleading, but resistance to these ideas was politically 
impossible. The attitude of  France was dangerously unclear. Britain had not got the 
manpower immediately to man the fleet, nor to provide troops for a substantial 
expedition. George II, who shared Walpole’s concerns about war, would only allow 2 
regiments of foot to be used on such an expedition. Despite raising six regiments of 
marines, politically, to signal the ministry’s earnestness for an expedition to the West 
Indies, it  looked unlikely in the early autumn of 1739. The two key factors changed 
this and made the expedition possible. The first was that the ministry became 
convinced that the threat from France was receding. The second was the prospect of 
raising 3000 Americans to support the 8000 British troops that could be sent to the 
West Indies.  With this force it was concluded a successful attack on Havana, the 
strongest and most important post, in the Spanish empire was possible. Without these 
American troops it is likely that the ultimate destination of the expedition would have 
been Manila29.  
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The possible use of American troops in a conflict with Spain was not new. It had been 
raised in 1727 by the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, Alexander Spotswood, and it 
was he that revived the suggestion to the Duke of Newcastle in November 1739. 
However, the project would not have been possible without the detailed knowledge of 
the colonies provided by Colonel Martin Bladen of the Board of Trade. Bladen was a 
conscientious member of the board since 1717 and had been gathering information 
about the resources in the colonies since 1721. In 1726 he had advised the Secretary 
of State Lord Townshend, that American levies could help to defend the West Indies 
in the war with Spain30.  Over the next few months, into early 1740,  Bladen attended 
an ad hoc committee consisting of the two senior naval officers in the kingdom, Sir 
Charles Wager and Sir John Norris, General Wade, Colonel Lascelles, and the 
commander of the land forces for the expedition, Major General Charles Cathcart. 
Bladen provided vital advice in how to organise the Americans. He proposed that 
rather than the Americans being attached to British regiments, they be regimented 
together as a single regiment of four battalions, commanded by Spotswood. The 
commissions for the officers were to be divided. Local gentlemen would be 
commissioned to command the companies and provide one lieutenant per company. 
This would encourage local men to enlist. The lieutenant colonels (commanding each 
battalion), majors and other lieutenant per company would be half-pay regular officers 
who were to ensure that the unit was properly disciplined31.  
 
The other important point was who was going to pay for these troops? Money that 
was to pay colonial assemblies for expenses incurred by British forces sent to Boston 
in 1711 still had not been paid. Much of the friction between the royal government 
and colonial society since 1713 had to do with financing royal government and the 
British government recognised that finances would be critical in the raising of these 
troops. . Despite precedent, it agreed to pay the men, equip and victual them at the 
same rate as the regulars. The responsibility for their victuals, pay and transport to the 
West Indies would rest with the colonial legislatures. In case the assemblies refused to 
provide funds, the adjutant general of the expedition was provided with bills of 
exchange to pay these necessaries. With some of the most significant obstacles 
removed, recruitment began across the colonies from Massachusetts to North Carolina 
in April 1740. This was bound to lead to a variety of approaches. The Massachusetts 
the social makeup of the companies closely resembled British units. In New York the 
militia companies provided the basis for recruitment. In Pennsylvania, Maryland and 
Virginia, white labour was at a premium, and there were fears that indentured servants 
would use this opportunity to escape their bonds. The unemployed were conscripted 
in Virginia.  Elderly Negroes were pushed into the ranks in Maryland. The slowness 
of some the legislatures in voting money meant men were not paid or properly 
victualled.  To keep costs to a minimum the men were billetted in the back country 
rather than the towns. Only 500 uniforms arrived from England as these were sent as 
patterns to be made up locally. They would receive their arms in the West Indies.  
 
The men who marched down to the transports in the autumn of 1740 were probably 
resentful, dishevelled and untutored in arms. One such man was James Stafford from 
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North Carolina. Like a number of other ambitious gentlemen, he had raised about 
forty men at his own expense in the expectation of being commissioned. They sailed 
for Jamaica on 29th November. On 12th December Stafford noted that a  ‘mutiny’ 
broke out. Sixty men had signed a round robin to Captain Robert Halton, one of the 
commanders of the North Carolina companies. They had been promised pay, bounty 
and clothes, but ‘We are kept in such a manner we can bare it no longer, for Wee lye 
more like Hogs than Men, as for our provisions it stinks, so that we can’t eat it, 
besides small allowance of potatoes that are so roten so hoping sir you will have a 
search to see whether the pork is not all so, for we are willing to serve his Majesty 
provided we have safisorlty (?) and if not we must seek out for our selves, for night is 
so cold and our clothes so thin that we diser a Speedy Answer as witness our hands’32 
 
 A few nights later the soldiers were issued with a quart of rum. They got drunk 
started fighting and were difficult to calm until two of them were tied together by 
neck and foot. Men deserted as the ship anchored off the coast. Stafford noted that 
proper care had not been taken to keep the men clean between decks and water was 
squandered away extravagantly.  By Christmas day fever and sickness were evident 
on the ship. They did not reach Port Royal until February, but at least they had not 
arrived before the British force and consequently they had not suffered the additional 
indignity of being refused their pay by the Jamaican legislature – something which 
further damaged morale of the regiment as a whole. On another ship, a lieutenant 
quarrelled with one of the men about his wife, which occasioned a mutiny in which 
one soldier was killed.  
 
These men may not have been representative of the Americans and it will be noted 
that evidence of low morale had occurred long before they met the British forces. The 
commander of the expeditionary force, Lieutenant General Thomas Wentworth 
initially formed a low opinion of the Americans, but gradually, he came to respect 
their ability to work in the broken country of the tropics. More Americans joined as 
replacements during 1741. The operations at Cartagena de las Indias, Guatanomos 
Bay, and Panama were unsuccessful, but what little evidence there is suggest  that 
they carried their role on shore and on the men of war honourably. During the course 
of the campaign they had not won riches or glory. They like the regulars suffered 
from disease.  More than  1800 of 3600 died on the expedition, with many more left 
debilitated by sickness. Only 543 mustered fit for service in October 1742.  
 
It was not a happy story, but it demonstrated the practicality of raising significant 
numbers of troops in America. However, one issue remained unresolved – should they 
be officered by British regulars or local gentlemen? The arguments were about 
effectiveness and the imperial future. The British army considered the American 
troops well suited to warfare in the tropics and wilderness. American officers, on the 
other hand, were considered amateur and incapable of rendering the men good 
soldiers. It was also recognised that Americans would be unlikely to enlist unless 
officered by the local gentry. The compromise of 1740 worked well. The initial 
commander of the expedition, Major General, Lord Cathcart, had decided to break up 
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the regiment and brigade its battalions with British regiments33. His successor,  
Lieutenant General Wentworth originally intended to replace the American officers 
with British regulars, but did not implement the plan34. He  promoted the British 
officers to replace American officers who died on service, but the promotion policy 
was not exclusive and was applied more to the subaltern ranks than the vital post 
captain. As the campaign progressed, Wentworth continued to worry about the 
Americans’ discipline, but he saw their abilities in bush warfare and, when the 
regiment was disbanded at the end of 1742, Wentworth was willing to recommend 
some of the American officers for half-pay35.  
 
The other argument related to the officers of the American troops was political. Since 
the 1720s there had been concern about the internal and external threats to the North 
American colonies. The Board of Trade, in particular, had to consider these linked 
problems. The French threat to the north had to be countered  by the colonists 
militarily organising themselves, but this military organisation must not be used to 
threaten their imperial subordination. In 1721, the French encroachments, the need for 
Britain to recover from the two recent exhausting wars, inclined the Board to 
recommend that the colonies be organised under a single Captain General for mutual 
defence36. By 1726, friction within the colonies against royal government, had 
occasioned a rethink. Colonel Bladen was asked to report on the matter to Lord 
Townshend and recommended that the governments be kept separate ‘for while they 
continue so, it is morally impossible that any dangerous Union can be formed 
amongst them’37. In 1727, the French threat  to Nova Scotia was seen as a possible 
means of reducing tension in Massachusetts. Raising forces to defend the frontier 
could be ‘draine a great number of inhabitants from New England where they are 
daily aiming at an independency and very much interfere with the trade of the Mother 
Country’38. 
 
The urgency of the war with Spain in 1739 overcame any doubts that Bladen and the 
ministry had had about American independence39. Nevertheless, the problem 
remained. When war with France broke out in March 1744, the militia provided local 
defence against French incursions. However, for offensive operations, troops had to 
be enlisted. In January 1744/5 Governor William Shirley began to raise a force of 
New Englanders to attack Louisbourg40. Although support from outside 
Massachusetts was limited, the fall of Louisbourg to this force, supported by a small 
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Royal Navy squadron under Commodore Peter Warren, on 17th June 1745, was the 
greatest conquest of the war.  
 
The prospect of the conquest of Canada opened up before the ministry in London and 
an expedition was prepared to join American levies at Louisbourg, to attack Québec 
while another American force was to drive up the Hudson valley towards Montreal. It 
remained to be decided how these American forces were to be organised and 
officered. The Duke of Bedford, who was a moving force for this expedition, had 
concerns about the long-term impact of independent American forces. It was decided 
to transfer the garrison regiments at Louisbourg to the British establishment under the 
command of Shirley and William Pepperell. However, the American officers would 
be replaced by British officers except for half of the ensigns. Shirley warned 
Newcastle that this would be disastrous. He doubted whether 100 men could be raised 
under those conditions and it would be far better to bring regulars from England41. 
The message was not lost and the new levies were ordered to be raised under local 
officers appointed by the governors of the various colonies. The soldiers would be 
paid the same as regulars, have an equal share in booty, and the costs of arming and 
equipping them would be met by London42. In the event the expedition was aborted, 
but the message of effective recruitment had been learned.  
 
The confidence that the American Regiment gave to the ministry in raising American 
forces was important in the wake of the capture of Louisbourg in June 1745. When 
news of the victory arrived in London opinion was divided, but it arrived at a critical 
time. The prospects of victory in the Low Countries had been dashed by the defeat of 
the field army at Fontenoy in May. This allied army had been painfully put together 
during the winter and great things were expected of it. Defeat left few hopes of a 
revival in this theatre. Louisbourg seemed to promise future successes in America. 
These was the first concrete evidence of what the ‘Patriot’ opposition had been 
claiming since 1742, that major colonial campaigns could be conducted successfully 
and have significant diplomatic consequences.  
 
The overall contribution of America to this war was evidently less dramatic than 
during the Seven Years War and had more to do with opening possibilities and 
establishing administrative and political processes than a direct impact on the enemy. 
Privateering, while the largest and most obvious effort, was important as part of a 
much larger exercise of seapower. Administrative procedures were established or 
developed for exploiting the economic resources of North America to support the 
West Indies. Manpower for the fleet, victuals and stores were important in 
maintaining the fragile plantation economies. The procedures adopted to raise 
American troops, made possible the projection of British military power, founded on 
the Royal Navy, to the enemy ashore.  New England initiative, allied to the Royal 
Navy, led to the capture of Louisbourg, which made an significant impact upon the 
tortuous negotiations leading to peace by October 1748.   
 
By mid 1754, the perception of a powerful French threat to North America was again 
exercising London. The Board of Trade was ordered to set in train a  “Plan of General 
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Union should be entered into by His Majesty’s several colonies for their mutual 
defence”43. Once again the question of a single commander in chief in America was 
on the table and the issue of American officers in colonial regiments re-emerged. The 
tensions this generated have been explored by Alison Olson among others.  It may be 
that these concerns in London led to Shirley and Pepperell being ordered to raise royal 
regiments on the basis of British officers filling a significant percentage of all the 
commissioned grades, contrary to the experience of 1740-244.  American company 
officers were to rank below the most junior British company officer of equivalent 
rank, and American general and field officers were not to rank at all. These expedients  
proved slow, barely adequate and contrasted clearly with the experience of raising 
provincial regiments to augment the British forces in the 1740s. While the precedent 
of American regiments was not without problems, it produced better results.  By 1757 
it was clear that the principle had to be conceded of raising American forces under 
local officers and ranking all American officers as the most junior by seniority on the 
establishment.  
 
This decision to accept that American regiments must be officered by local gentlemen 
was very important for the future of the provincial regiments. It was one of a number 
of factors that opened the way to the mass recruiting of 1758-1759. While 
professional concerns from the regular army, and political concern to maintain 
colonial subordination, jointly caused this delay, the experience of the American 
Regiment between 1740 and 1742 and the Massachusetts forces in 1745 provided a 
guide for future. 
 
It could be argued that, that despite the contribution of privateering, the regiment of 
1740 was, at the time, America’s most important contribution to the war. It made a 
credible expedition to the Spanish Indies possible, which was Britain’s only 
politically acceptable offensive option. It contributed something to a shift in focus 
towards utilising American forces in 1745-6, which in turn was a significant, although 
distant, factor in altering the balance of power in North America in the 1750s. Thus it 
played a small part in making Britain a global power by 1763.   
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